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INTRODUCTION 
John Navarrete sued Hill’s Pet Nutrition, a dog food manufacturer, after 
it voluntarily recalled some of its products for containing too much vitamin 
D.1 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized2 Navarrete’s 
case with ve other cases pursuant to the multidistrict litigation statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1407.3 All six plaintis claimed that their pets died or became 
seriously ill because they consumed the recalled products.4 The centralized 
proceeding is currently pending in the District of Kansas, where all pretrial 
matters will be resolved.5 
A few states to the West, Bradley Colgate, along with forty-four 
individuals from twenty-two dierent states, sued JUUL Labs, a leader in the 
electronic cigarette industry.6 The plaintis alleged that JUUL used research 
from the tobacco industry to create a product that is more addictive than 
traditional cigarettes and targeted at youth.7 The Panel centralized Colgate’s 
case with nine other multiparty cases, all involving claims that JUUL 
marketed its products to attract minors, misrepresented or omitted that its 
products are more potent and addictive than traditional cigarettes, and 
promoted nicotine addiction.8 There may be more than forty additional 
related actions.9 The centralized proceeding is currently pending in the 
Northern District of California.10 
Moving to the East Coast, more than 14,000 plaintis sued manufacturers 
of products containing asbestos in eighty-seven federal districts, alleging 
personal injury or wrongful death caused by asbestos exposure.11 The 
litigation involved thousands of deaths, millions of injuries, and billions of 
dollars.12 The Panel centralized 26,639 actions, all involving questions of the 
danger attributable to airborne asbestos in industrial materials and products.13 
 
1 Navarrete v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., No. C 19-00767, 2019 WL 1932388, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
May 1, 2019). 
2 “Centralization” refers to the process of transferring civil cases pending in dierent federal 
districts that involve one or more common questions of fact to one federal district for coordinated 
pretrial proceedings. See Overview of Panel, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., 
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/overview-panel-0 [https://perma.cc/EFM7-B4DS]. 
3 In re Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1350-51 (J.P.M.L. 2019). 
4 Id. at 1351 & n.2. 
5 Id. at 1351. 
6 Colgate v. JUUL Labs, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 3d 728, 736 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
7 Id. 
8 In re Juul Labs, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2019). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 1368. 
11 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 416 (J.P.M.L. 1991). 
12 Id. at 418. 
13 Id. at 416. 
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The centralized proceeding is currently pending in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania—and has been since 1991.14 
These three cases vary greatly, and not just in their subject matter. One 
involves a handful of plaintis, while another involves tens of thousands. One 
involves lawsuits originating in 2019, while another includes lawsuits that are 
thirty years old. These examples illustrate the enormous diversity of cases 
centralized in MDLs across the country. Because of this diversity, there is no 
uniform set of federal rules governing MDL proceedings. Instead, MDL 
judges craft procedure specically suited for the particular case before them,15 
guided by the knowledge shared by the Panel on its website, the Manual for 
Complex Litigation, and the experience of seasoned MDL attorneys.16 But 
this could soon change. 
In November 2017, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules rst addressed 
the possibility of creating new rules specically for MDL.17 The corporate 
defense bar, most notably Lawyers for Civil Justice, had been urging the 
Committee for years to adopt MDL-specic rules, arguing that ad hoc 
procedures lack transparency, uniformity, and predictability, and are unfair to 
defendants.18 At its next meeting, the Committee appointed a Subcommittee 
to study the need for MDL-specic rules.19 Since then, the Subcommittee 
has gathered more information and reached out to active players in MDL 
 
14 Id. at 424. 
15 Creative procedures deployed by judges in MDLs include the use of plaintiff and defendant 
fact sheets and Lone Pine orders; case groupings; consolidated complaints and motions sequencing; 
and coordination with parallel state court cases. See generally CATHERINE R. BORDEN, FED. JUD. 
CTR., MANAGING RELATED PROPOSED CLASS ACTIONS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (2018), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/21/Managing_Related_Proposed_Class_Actions_in_
Multidistrict_Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZS4-U6YJ] (identifying successful judicial strategies 
for handling multiple overlapping or conflicting class actions in multidistrict litigation proceedings); 
U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. & FED. JUD. CTR., TEN STEPS TO BETTER CASE 
MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION TRANSFEREE JUDGES (2d ed. 2014), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Ten-Steps-MDL-Judges-2D.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ER7N-K4W9] [hereinafter TEN STEPS TO BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT]. 
16 See U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov 
[https://perma.cc/J74B-H35W] (providing links to rules and procedures governing multidistrict 
litigation); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22 (2004) (discussing categories of 
information helpful to judges managing mass tort suits). 
17 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., AGENDA: MEETING OF 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, 469-76 (Nov. 7, 2017), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-11-CivilRulesAgendaBook_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KY2H-WZUN] [hereinafter NOVEMBER 2017 MEETING]. 
18 Reform MDLs, LAWS. FOR CIV. JUST., https://www.lfcj.com/rules-for-mdls.html 
[https://perma.cc/BMV3-4EXM]. 
19 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., AGENDA: MEETING OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 93 (Apr. 10, 2018), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04-civil-rules-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW94-
VEJF] [hereinafter APRIL 2018 MEETING]. 
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proceedings. At its meeting in October 2019, it identied four topics as the 
center of its current work: early vetting to weed out meritless claims, 
opportunities for interlocutory appellate review, settlement review, and third-
party litigation funding disclosure.20 In April 2020, the Subcommittee 
narrowed its focus to the rst three.21 And in October 2020, the 
Subcommittee made signicant progress: it decided not to pursue rulemaking 
for expanded interlocutory appellate review, but it is still studying potential 
rules for screening claims and judicial supervision of settlement.22 
Although some of these topics are more appropriate for rulemaking than 
others, this Comment argues that the Subcommittee should decline to move 
forward with any rule proposal. This Comment rst provides an overview of 
MDL in Part I. It explains the basic structure of § 1407 and the mechanics of 
transfer. Next, Part I oers a brief history of § 1407, starting with the 
considerations that prompted its passage in the rst place. This history tells 
an important story about the reason for MDL’s exible design. The drafters 
of § 1407 wanted to give federal judges exibility to handle increasingly 
complex litigation. They crafted § 1407 to be free from rigid, formulaic 
procedural requirements—despite backlash from the corporate defense bar 
that closely mirrors the language used to advocate for MDL-specic rules 
today.23 Part I then describes recent MDL practice: its rise in popularity 
following more restrictive judicial attitudes toward Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the makeup of MDLs currently pending in 
federal district courts. Part I concludes by addressing the progress the Rules 
Committee has made since deciding to consider proposals for MDL-specic 
rules in 2017, current through its October 2020 meeting. 
Part II of this Comment examines the advantages and disadvantages of 
MDL rulemaking. It frames the discussion in terms of the two aims of the 
 
20 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., AGENDA: MEETING 
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 102-03 (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019-10_civil_rules_agenda_book.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/86VJ-P4X5] [hereinafter OCTOBER 2019 MEETING]. 
21 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., AGENDA: MEETING 
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 26-27 (Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/04-2020_civil_rules_agenda_book.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P7PA-V789] [hereinafter APRIL 2020 MEETING]. 
22 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., AGENDA: MEETING 
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 151 (Oct. 16, 2020), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10_civil_rules_agenda_book_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/97QQ-W5EV] [hereinafter OCTOBER 2020 MEETING]. 
23 See Andrew D. Bradt, ‘A Radical Proposal’: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. 
L. REV. 831, 831–32 (2017) (discussing how those who developed MDL were anything but modest, 
and developed it as a mechanism “to centralize power over nationwide litigation in the hands of 
individual judges committed to the principles of active case management”). 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: efficiency and fairness.24 Part II also discusses 
other considerations that must be weighed in deciding whether to adopt MDL-
specific rules, including precautions already in place to limit bias from ad hoc 
procedure and the significant variation between small and large MDLs. 
Part III of this Comment focuses on the four proposals the Subcommittee 
has decided to study: early vetting, opportunities for interlocutory appellate 
review, settlement review, and third-party litigation funding disclosure. 
Rather than providing an exhaustive description of these proposals, Part III 
uses them as a vehicle for examining the appropriateness of the MDL-
rulemaking enterprise as a whole. It argues that balancing the costs and 
benets of these four proposals reveals that MDL-specic rules will not 
promote eciency and fairness and should not be adopted. 
Finally, Part IV concludes with a discussion of alternatives to federal 
rulemaking, including action by Congress, an MDL working group, 
amending the current rules, and education. Although these alternatives each 
have their costs, many are better suited for the MDL context than 
promulgating an entirely new set of rules. More importantly, most current 
literature fails to consider possibilities for MDL reform beyond federal 
rulemaking, and this Comment hopes to encourage scholars and others 
invested in MDL procedure to expand the conversation outside the four 
corners of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I. OVERVIEW OF MDL 
The multidistrict litigation statute provides that “civil actions involving 
one or more common questions of fact . . . pending in dierent 
districts . . . may be transferred to any district for coordinated or 
consolidated pretrial proceedings.”25 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation, comprised of seven federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice 
of the United States, decides whether transfer “will promote the just and 
ecient conduct of such actions,” and orders transfer if it so concludes.26 The 
Panel may only transfer cases for pretrial purposes: it may not transfer cases 
for consolidated trial.27 Pretrial matters range from deciding class 
 
24 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[These rules] should be construed, administered, and employed by 
the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 
and proceeding.”). 
25 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
26 Id. 
27 See id. (“[S]uch actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated 
pretrial proceedings.”); see also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 
26, 40 (1998) (foreclosing self-transfer of MDLs for trial by the transferee judge). But see Chair of 
Judicial Panel Sees Role as Gatekeeper, THIRD BRANCH, (U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Nov. 2005 at 1, 3 
(“We’re hopeful that in this Congress . . . Lexecon will be a thing of the past.”). 
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certication motions and motions to dismiss to resolving discovery disputes 
and managing expert disclosures.28 After pretrial proceedings are nished, 
the action “shall be remanded by the panel . . . to the district from which it 
was transferred.”29 Even with this limitation, the eects of pretrial transfer 
are signicant. Only about three percent of cases return to the transferor 
court—the rest are settled or resolved by dispositive motion in the MDL 
court.30 Because trials are rare, pretrial proceedings are the “main event”—
and these pretrial proceedings are squarely within the purview of the MDL 
judge.31 
The Panel may transfer an MDL proceeding to any district, even if venue 
and personal jurisdiction requirements would ordinarily foreclose that forum to 
the parties.32 Transfer may be initiated by the Panel upon its own initiative, or 
upon motion “filed with the panel by a party in any action in which 
transfer . . . may be appropriate.”33 If a party opposes transfer, it may petition for 
an extraordinary writ in the court of appeals with jurisdiction over the transferee 
district court.34 In contrast, an order denying transfer is not reviewable.35 
Like all civil actions in federal court, MDLs are governed by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.36 Although the Panel may prescribe rules for its 
 
28 TEN STEPS TO BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 15, at 3. 
29 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
30 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399-401 
(2014) (“Multidistrict litigation has frequently been described as a ‘black hole’ because transfer is 
typically a one-way ticket.” (footnote omitted)); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: 
Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 
1669, 1673 (2017) (“Although styled as a mechanism for only pretrial resolution of cases unamenable 
to class action but with sucient similarities to justify some consolidation, it is the worst-kept secret 
in civil procedure that the MDL is really a dispositive, not pretrial, action.” (footnote omitted)). 
31 See Bradt, supra note 23, at 834-35 (“[T]he vast majority of transferred cases are terminated 
or settled before pretrial proceedings conclude, that is, while they are within the control of the MDL 
judge. In a world where trials are exceedingly rare, pretrial proceedings are the main event.” 
(footnote omitted)); see also Marc Galanter & Angela M. Frozena, A Grin Without A Cat: The 
Continuing Decline & Displacement of Trials in American Courts, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 115, 121 
(“[T]he decline [in trials] has become institutionalized in the practices and expectations of judges, 
administrators, lawyers, and parties.”). 
32 See, e.g., In re Aircraft Accident, 474 F. Supp. 996, 999 (J.P.M.L. 1979) (“The Panel’s 
discretion under Section 1407 is not limited by venue considerations . . . and the fact that defendants 
may not all be amenable to suit in the same jurisdiction does not prevent transfer to a single district 
for pretrial proceedings where the prerequisites of Section 1407 are otherwise satised.”). For an 
analysis of the role of personal jurisdiction in MDL, see Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of 
Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165 (2018). 
33 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(i-ii). 
34 Id. § 1407(e). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. § 1407(f); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions 
and proceedings in the United States district courts . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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operations (and has done so twenty-ve times37), these rules must be 
consistent with the Civil Rules.38 Because MDL requires a higher degree of 
practical problem solving than “traditional” two-party civil litigation, MDL 
judges are emboldened to develop special MDL procedures that vary from 
case to case.39 
This Section begins with a brief history of § 1407, focusing in particular 
on the considerations that prompted its creators to delegate authority to the 
Panel instead of promulgating a rm set of rules. It then discusses recent 
trends in MDL practice and the overlap between MDL and its complex 
litigation cousin, the class action. This section concludes with a description 
of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rule’s progress through its October 2020 
Subcommittee meeting. 
A. A Brief History 
A small group of judges, aided by scholar Phil C. Neil, invented the MDL 
statute in the early 1960s, predicting a “litigation explosion” as a result of the 
increased prevalence of mass torts.40 A ood of antitrust litigation brought 
against electrical equipment manufacturers beginning in 1961 likely inspired 
the prediction.41 The complaints alleged conspiracies to divide business and 
x prices among virtually every American manufacturer of electrical 
equipment, culminating in over 1,800 cases in thirty-ve federal district 
courts during a twelve-month period.42 The judges and scholar behind the 
creation of the MDL statute believed that control over these cases ought not 
remain in the hands of the parties or their attorneys—or even in the hands of 
ordinary federal judges.43 Instead, they recognized a need for more ecient 
management of complex, multiparty, multidistrict litigation. 
 
37 RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (2016). For a 
summary of these rules, see Summary of Panel Rules, U.S. CTS. (Oct. 4, 2010), 
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Summary%20of%20Panel%20Rules_Revised_10
-4-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZUW9-4CYX]. 
38 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f). 
39 See Gluck, supra note 30, at 1673-74 (“MDLs exemplify procedural exceptionalism. This is a 
type of litigation that judges insist is unique, too dierent from case to case to be managed by the 
transsubstantive values that form the very soul of the FRCP. Instead, judges develop their own 
special MDL procedures . . . .”). 
40 Bradt, supra note 23, at 834; see also Bradt, supra note 32, at 1199 (noting that MDL “was 
invented by an academic, Dean Phil C. Neal of the University of Chicago, and United States District 
Judge William H. Becker of the Western District of Missouri”). 
41 See generally Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel 
Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621 (1964). 
42 Bradt, supra note 23, at 855. 
43 Id. at 855–56. 
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In 1962, Chief Justice Warren assembled a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Pretrial Procedure to consider the problems “arising from 
discovery procedures in multiple litigation led in dierent judicial districts 
but with common witnesses and exhibits.”44 Eventually, the Subcommittee 
decided to centralize pretrial proceedings with later remand for trial. This 
system enabled judges to exibly and innovatively manage complex litigation, 
while still allowing plaintis’ lawyers to meaningfully control their cases.45 
Although the Subcommittee had no express authority to require judges to 
take specic actions, it managed to convince many judges to adopt a 
coordinated approach to case management.46 
The Subcommittee’s success managing the electrical equipment cases led 
to requests that it also shepherd other litigation surges.47 In addition, it 
prompted a proposal that Congress create a more permanent body to perform 
this task.48 In 1968, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1407, and the Panel assumed 
the Subcommittee’s role as centralizer. 
B. Use of the MDL Statute Today 
For most of its history, attorneys, judges, and even scholars treated the 
MDL statute as a “little-utilized and disfavored judicial backwater,” 
preferring the class action for managing complex litigation, particularly in 
large products-liability cases.49 Indeed, before 1990 the Panel centralized only 
six products-liability MDL proceedings.50 But things have changed. 
As of July 2020, MDLs account for 130,649 pending cases in federal district 
court.51 That means that MDLs comprise more than one-third of the 
 
44 Id. (quoting Press Release, Admin. O. of the U.S. Cts. 1-2 (Feb. 7, 1962)). 
45 Id. at 839 (“Such a ‘limited transfer’ structure would insulate the statute from . . . the resistance 
of plaintiffs’ lawyers who might fear loss of control over their cases . . . . The transfer structure might 
also, however, create the necessary central control for a single judge to manage the litigation.”). 
46 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., AGENDA: MEETING OF 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 140-41 (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/les/2018-11_civil_rules_agenda_book_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/34N9-237L] [hereinafter NOVEMBER 2018 MEETING]. 
47 Id. at 141. 
48 Id. 
49 Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 511, 552 (2013); see also Bradt, supra note 23, at 832 (“As recently as a decade ago, it would 
have been reasonable to say that multidistrict litigation . . . was a second banana to the class 
action . . . .”); Gluck, supra note 30, at 1671 (describing MDL as “the quieter sibling of class actions”). 
50 Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: 
Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 793 (2010). 
51 U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT – 
DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY ACTIONS PENDING 3 (2020), 
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/les/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_Actions_Pending-
July-16-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HWQ-FXHM]. 
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approximately 340,000 pending civil cases in federal courts.52 The roughly 
120,000 cases pending in MDLs have been centralized into 227 actions, and 
the largest action contains over 20,000 cases.53 It is important to recognize, 
however, that the large number of MDL cases in recent years “has been 
principally due to there being, at any given time, about two dozen MDLs with 
1,000 or more cases.”54 Although these cases, which are typically categorized 
as products-liability litigation, tend to occupy public attention, they are not 
representative of MDL as a whole.55 Overall, the number of MDL dockets has 
declined by about fifty percent since 2009.56 Nevertheless, MDL continues to 
play a significant role in the current civil litigation landscape. 
One explanation for the changing perception of MDL as a tool for 
resolving mass litigation is changing judicial attitudes toward class 
certication under Rule 23.57 Rule 23(f) and the Class Action Fairness Act 
have changed the procedural landscape, and “[n]umerous courts have become 
skeptical about certifying class actions.”58 Although MDL centralization is 
“not exactly an alternative to class action aggregation of claims,”59 it is often 
used to accomplish essentially the same purpose.60 This centralization has 
many advantages. The MDL process confers benets on plaintis, 
defendants, and even judges. Plaintis can band together and combine 
resources to achieve parity with well-resourced defendants, while defendants 
appreciate the value of global peace—the opportunity “to litigate all claims 
in a single forum where they can both eciently perform discovery and 
motion practice and eventually achieve peace, whether through victory on a 
 
52 Letter from Zachary D. Clopton, Assoc. Professor of L., Cornell L. Sch., to Members of 
the Subcomm. on Multidistrict Litig. 2 (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-
y-suggestion_clopton_re_mdl_rulemaking_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ8H-2THY]. 
53 Id. at 1. 
54 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., AGENDA: MEETING OF 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 207 (Apr. 2-3, 2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/les/2019-04_civil_rules_agenda_book.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7S9C-9LB5] [hereinafter APRIL 2019 MEETING]. 
55 Letter from Zachary D. Clopton, supra note 52, at 2. 
56 APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 207. 
57 See Panel Promotes Just and Ecient Conduct of Litigation, THIRD BRANCH (U.S. Cts., Wash., 
D.C.) Feb. 2010, at 3 (“The advent of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and evolving judicial 
views of class certication under Rule 23 have coincided to make centralization under Section 1407 
an often attractive alternative for resolving complex aggregated claims.”). 
58 Robert H. Klono, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 731-32 (2013); see 
also Willging & Lee, supra note 50, at 784 (“Rule 23(f) has almost certainly contributed to the 
restriction in class action certication during the past decade.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious 
Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 390 (2011) (“Because the formal class 
action rule became an inconvenient impediment to resolving aggregate claims favorably to both 
plainti and defense interests, actors involved in mass litigation now promote MDL 
procedure . . . as an entirely useful, creative legal ction to accomplish self-interested goals.”). 
59 Willging & Lee, supra note 50, at 794. 
60 Bradt, supra note 23, at 835. 
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dispositive motion or through settlement.”61 Judges, and the judicial system 
more generally, benet from the docket-clearing and eciency gains 
centralization provides, as well as from the exibility to manage complex and 
novel issues using dierent procedures and management techniques.62 
Despite its utility, MDL also presents unique challenges to judges and 
litigants. One judge described managing MDLs as “like Rule 16 on Steroids. 
In the MDL, you need to strategize more. You have to look beyond 
immediate deadlines and see how all the pieces t together.”63 Scholars have 
also expressed concern about the lack of procedural protections for plaintis 
in MDL proceedings, including the lack of an opt-out option or judicial 
review of settlement fairness.64 In light of the strong positions taken both for 
and against MDL proceedings, it is unsurprising that the Rules Committee 
has now determined to examine them more closely. 
C. Rules Committee Progress 
In November 2017, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules first asked 
“whether the time has come to undertake an effort to generate rules specifically 
adapted to MDL proceedings.”65 There are many reasons the Committee may 
have decided that nearly fifty years after Congress passed § 1407 it was time to 
take up that question. Undoubtedly, the Committee was influenced by the 
increasing popularity of the MDL statute for resolving mass torts.66 Pressure 
 
61 Id. at 836; see also Burch, supra note 30, at 414 (“Centralization likewise advantages 
defendants by making meaningful closure possible through a global settlement.”). 
62 Bradt, supra note 23, at 836; see also An Interview with Judge John F. Nangle: Chair of the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, THIRD BRANCH (Dec. 1995), 
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/The%20Third%20Branch%20-%20December-
1995-Nangle%20Interview.pdf [https://perma.cc/ D3VC-WVFP] (“[C]entralization eliminates 
duplication of discovery; avoids inconsistent pretrial rulings; conserves the resources of the parties, their 
counsel and the Judiciary; and thereby expedites the entire proceeding . . . . [T]he panel has, through 
experience, developed a very solid corps of judges who are highly skilled in handling special types of 
litigation.”). 
63 Gluck, supra note 30, at 1688. 
64 See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 58, at 391 (“The deployment of MDL jurisdiction . . . has 
stripped away protections aorded by class action requirements. Mass litigation actors may now 
settle complex cases largely unconstrained by law.”); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size 
Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. 
L. REV. 109, 110 (2015) (“[T]he current practice of MDL actually makes the modern class action 
appear to be the pinnacle of procedural due process by comparison.”). 
65 NOVEMBER 2017 MEETING, supra note 17, at 477. 
66 See Bradt, supra note 23, at 833 (“With the Supreme Court and lower courts cutting back the 
viability of the class action under Rule 23 for decades and with Congress providing for expanded 
jurisdiction over class actions in the federal courts, MDL has become the leading mechanism for 
resolving mass torts.” (footnote omitted)). 
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from the corporate bar, most notably from Lawyers for Civil Justice,67 also 
likely played a role. The first proposals to the Committee for amending the 
rules were made in November 2017 by Lawyers for Civil Justice, the 
Washington Legal Foundation, and the Duke Center for Judicial Studies, 
represented by John Rabiej.68 All three proposals reflected a concern that “[t]he 
felt pressures of managing MDL proceedings, particularly in those that bring 
together the largest numbers of cases, lead MDL judges to create imaginative 
procedures only loosely anchored in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”69 
Lawyers for Civil Justice and the Washington Legal Foundation expressed 
concern that “[l]arge MDL proceedings attract many claimants whose 
purported claims have no foundation in fact, and there is no eective means 
for screening them out.”70 Lawyers for Civil Justice oered seven proposals: 
(1) master complaints; (2) particularized pleading; (3) initial evidence; (4) 
permissive joinder of plaintis; (5) required disclosures; (6) true consent for 
bellwether trials; and (7) appellate review.71 The Washington Legal 
Foundation supported the proposals by Lawyers for Civil Justice, oering 
two papers emphasizing the potential for MDLs to become “warehouses for 
meritless, unvetted claims that would be quickly dismissed if brought as 
individualized actions.”72 
The Duke Center for Judicial Studies oered a dierent perspective, 
suggesting a new Rule 23.3 limited to MDL proceedings. The rule would 
cover actions that include 900 or more individual cases, which account for 
about ninety percent of all centralized cases.73 The proposal contends that 
these mega-cases would be better handled if, “‘at some point after most 
discovery takes place,’ and shortly after the bellwether cases have been 
selected, the work is divided among ve judges ‘to decide whether to dispose 
of a case on motion, settle, or remand.’”74 Unlike the proposals recommended 
by Lawyers for Civil Justice and the Washington Legal Foundation, the 
Committee has not considered this proposal further. 
In April 2018, the Committee appointed a Subcommittee to gather more 
information on MDL and MDL-specic rules because, although “[v]aluable 
information has been provided . . . it is mostly from one 
 
67 Lawyers for Civil Justice describes itself as “a partnership of leading corporate counsel and 
defense bar practitioners . . . forg[ing] alliances among its members and leverag[ing] the strength of those 
alliances to help restore and maintain balance in the civil justice system.” About Us, LAWS. FOR CIV. 
JUST., https://www.lfcj.com/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/LP9E-YSG7]. 
68 NOVEMBER 2017 MEETING, supra note 17, at 469-76, 535-37. 
69 Id. at 469. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 469-74. 
72 Id. at 475-76. 
73 Id. at 476. 
74 Id. 
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perspective. . . . [T]he Committee needs more, particularly from the Judicial 
Panel.”75 The Committee resolved to launch a six- to twelve-month project to 
gather information to inform the decision of whether to generate new rules.76 
It determined to seek information from the Panel,77 as well as from bar 
groups, but did not commit to study any particular proposals.78 By November 
2018, little progress had been made. The Committee had gathered more 
information but was not yet prepared to make recommendations about 
whether to consider possible rule amendments.79 
In October 2019, the Committee reported that “[i]t had gathered a lot of 
information,” but it “remains an open question whether it will be useful to 
propose any MDL-specic rules.”80 One of the most notable features of this 
meeting was an increase in the number of voices heard, particularly from 
outside the corporate bar. In addition to proposals from Lawyers for Civil 
Justice, the Subcommittee gathered research from the Federal Judicial Center 
Research Division,81 as well as materials from Professor Zachary Clopton,82 
John Beisner,83 Bracket Denniston and twenty-ve other general counsels,84 
 
75 APRIL 2018 MEETING, supra note 19, at 93. 
76 Id. 
77 The Panel “seem[ed] to have some understandable skepticism about whether rule changes 
would materially improve MDL practice. Panel members . . . may be inclined to think that 
distinctive aspects of dierent MDLs make some overarching set of new rules hard to imagine.” Id. 
at 158. 
78 Id. at 148-53. 
79 See NOVEMBER 2018 MEETING, supra note 46, at 139-40 (“[The Subcommittee] continues 
to gather information and has not yet attempted to develop recommendations about whether to 
consider possible rule amendments, or what amendments, if any, should be given serious study.”). 
80 OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 102. 
81 Id. at 225. The Federal Judicial Center’s statutory mission is “to conduct and stimulate 
research and development for the improvement of judicial administration.” MARGARET S. 
WILLIAMS, EMERY G. LEE III & JASON A. CANTONE, FED. JUD. CTR., PLAINTIFF FACT SHEETS 
IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION: PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROCEEDINGS 2008-2018 (2019). 
82 See Letter from Zachary D. Clopton, supra note 52, at 1 (“The current proposals call for 
specialized rules for a subset of federal cases, a departure from the norm that should not be made 
lightly.”). 
83 See Letter from John H. Beisner, Litig. Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
LLP, to Ms. Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., Admin. Off. of 
the U.S. Cts. (Nov. 21, 2018),	https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-bb-
suggestion_beisner_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PKD-SLHV] (responding to the proposed Rule 
23.3, which would allow intermediate interlocutory appeal in some circumstances). 
84 See Letter from Brackett B. Denniston, III, Former Senior Vice President and Gen. Couns., 
Gen. Elec. et al., to Ms. Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., Admin. 
O. of the U.S. Cts. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/les/19-cv-h-
suggestion_us_chamber_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6986-ZAA5] (supporting the proposal to amend 
Rule 26(a)(1)(A)). 
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Eric Blinderman and two other representatives of litigation funders,85 and 
Christopher Bogart of Burford, also a litigation funder.86 
Also in October 2019, the Subcommittee identied four topics as the 
center of current work: (1) early vetting of individual cases to weed out 
meritless claims; (2) opportunities for interlocutory review; (3) settlement 
review; and (4) third-party litigation funding.87 It also determined that 
rulemaking proposals primarily concern the mega-MDLs that aggregate 
thousands and tens of thousands of cases and elected to focus analysis on 
these proceedings.88 
In April 2020, the Subcommittee reported that its work is “ongoing.”89 It 
continued to explore the four topics it identied as central at its October 2019 
meeting, but it focused primarily on early vetting and interlocutory and 
settlement review.90 To supplement its discussion, the Subcommittee 
canvassed the use of census techniques in four major MDL proceedings.91 As 
at its other meetings, the Subcommittee also outlined arguments in favor and 
against the adoption of each MDL rule proposal, which are explored in detail 
in Part III. 
At its most recent meeting in October 2020, the Subcommittee 
determined that rulemaking should not be pursued for providing expanded 
interlocutory appellate review.92 It based its decision on (1) the potential for 
signicant delay if expanded appellate review is possible; (2) broad judicial 
opposition to expanded appellate review; and (3) diculties dening the 
subset of MDL proceedings in which expanded appellate review should be 
available, among other factors.93 The Subcommittee has not yet decided if 
rulemaking should be pursued for screening claims or judicial supervision of 
settlement.94 It is collecting more information on the eectiveness of “census” 
techniques for identifying meritless claims and organizing MDL 
 
85 See Letter from Eric H. Blinderman, Chief Exec. Ocer, Therium Cap. Mgmt. et al., to 
Ms. Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., Admin. O. of the U.S. Cts. 
(Feb.	20,	2019),	https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/les/19-cv-e-suggestion_burford_capital
_et_al_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BMJ-9YK3] (opposing the proposal to amend Rule 26(a)(1)(A)). 
86 See Letter from Christopher P. Bogart, Chief Exec. Ocer, Burford Cap., to Ms. Rebecca 
A. Womeldorf, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., Admin. O. of the U.S. Cts. (Feb. 20, 
2019) (on le with author) (rebutting the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform’s claim that the 
business community does not use litigation nancing). 
87 OCTOER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 103–04. 
88 See id. at 103 (“Drafting rules that distinguish the many smaller MDLs might prove difficult.”). 
89 APRIL 2020 MEETING, supra note 21, at 145. 
90 Id. at 145, 148, 154. 
91 Id. at 147-48. 
92 OCTOBER 2020 MEETING, supra note 22, at 151. 
93 Id. at 156-57. 
94 Id. at 151.  
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proceedings, and on the experiences of leadership counsel in global 
settlement negotiations.95 
II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MDL RULEMAKING 
The purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is “to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”96 
Any amendments to these rules or attempts to create a new set of federal rules 
ought to further this objective. This Part examines the advantages and 
disadvantages of MDL-specic rules at a big-picture level. It frames the 
discussion in terms of eciency—aimed at achieving the “speedy” and 
“inexpensive” goals of the Civil Rules—and fairness—aimed at achieving the 
“just” goal of the Civil Rules. Part III provides a more focused examination 
of the advantages and disadvantages of the four potential rule topics the 
Subcommittee is most seriously considering. 
In the context of federal rulemaking, “what the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules does not do is, in some ways, as important as what it 
does. . . . Amendments do not and should not happen often.”97 Changes to 
procedure through rulemaking tend to be modest, but that does not make 
them unimportant. The class action context provides a helpful example: 
“[T]he repeated attempts to revise the class action rules, attempts that have 
resulted in relatively marginal changes, have demonstrated the diculty of 
making massive changes through the rulemaking process.”98 It is likely that 
any changes in the MDL context would be similar—evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary. Nevertheless, even small changes can be signicant.99 
 
95 Id. at 152-53, 160.  
96 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
97 Richard Marcus, Shoes that Did Not Drop, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 637 (2013). 
98 Andrew D. Bradt, The Looming Battle for Control of Multidistrict Litigation in Historical 
Perspective, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 101 (2018); see also Richard Marcus, Revolution v. Evolution in 
Class Action Reform, 96 N.C. L. REV. 903, 917 (2018) (“In terms of potentially revolutionary change, 
the rst two experiences with amending Rule 23 produced an evolution away from revolution that 
has continued through the most recent episode.”). 
99 See Bradt, supra note 98, at 99–100 (noting that the eects of the interlocutory appeal 
provision for class certication in Rule 23(f), despite being the product of “evolutionary” rather than 
“revolutionary” change, are “signicant and important”). 
2021] e Case Against MDL Rulemaking 289 
The complexity of rulemaking in the MDL context100 may compel 
rulemakers to “shy away from [it] simply as a matter of prudence.”101 MDLs 
come in a variety of shapes and sizes, and crafting transsubstantive rules that 
work equally well in the largest and smallest MDLs would be dicult.102 One 
of the reasons the drafters of the MDL statute chose to turn to Congress 
instead of rulemaking in the 1960s was because of the diculty and time-
consuming nature of the project.103 The diculties identied in the 1960s 
apply with equal force today. But even if rulemaking may be dicult and 
time-consuming, it should be done if the changes will better serve the goals 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The arguments for and against MDL rulemaking can be framed in terms 
of two litigation goals: eciency and fairness. So far, “the battle lines are 
drawn; well-funded corporate defense groups in favor of rules want to limit 
discretion of MDL judges, while the plaintis’ bar and [the Panel] are 
copacetic with the status quo.”104 
The underlying arguments for amending the rules can also be grouped into 
two categories: (1) “that MDL judges need to be constrained,” and (2) “that 
MDL attracts meritless claims that are underexamined before being folded 
into a global settlement.”105 Proponents of MDL-specific rules argue that 
elevated judicial management will provide more efficient resolution of massive 
and unwieldy proceedings.106 Pointing to data suggesting that “between 30-40 
 
100 See NOVEMBER 2017 MEETING, supra note 17, at 477 (“A great deal of information must be 
gathered to support useful rulemaking. The information includes the character of the common 
elements of MDL proceedings and of the disparate elements that aect some number—perhaps 
most—of them. The necessary information also includes the range of practices that have emerged 
and the contexts in which they have emerged.”). 
As Professor Clopton explained, 
Looking at the full set of 227 MDLs, fewer than one third are products-liability cases. 
The next largest categories are antitrust and sales practice litigation, with the 
remaining cases including contract, disasters, employment, intellectual property, and 
securities. The smallest MDLs are sometimes products-liability litigation. But they 
also often involve cases sounding in antitrust, data security, intellectual property, 
marketing and sales practice, and securities law. 
Letter from Zachary D. Clopton, supra note 52, at 2. 
101 Bradt, supra note 98, at 101. 
102 Just in product-liability MDL proceedings, the FJC found that the number of cases ranged 
from three to over 40,000. APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 210. 
103 See Bradt, supra note 98, at 101 (“Indeed, one of the main reasons why Judge Murrah and 
Judge Becker, at Judge Maris’s encouragement, backed away from rulemaking for MDL in the 1960s 
was the potential diculty and time-consuming nature of the project.”). 
104 Id. at 99. 
105 Id. at 98. 
106 Letter from Zachary D. Clopton, supra note 52, at 3. But although “[t]his might be true for 
the large MDLs . . . it does not seem particularly persuasive for the scores of MDLs comprising a 
handful of consolidated cases.” Id. 
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percent of all filed MDL cases turn out (often at the settlement stage) to be 
unsupportable,” they argue that the lack of rules for MDL forces courts, and 
defendants, to waste time and resources on meritless claims.107 
A. Eciency 
The MDL statute was born from a desire to foster more ecient 
resolution of complex cases. Congress recognized that “[t]he main purpose of 
transfer for consolidation or coordination of pretrial proceedings is to 
promote the ends of ecient justice . . . .”108 The drafters of the MDL statute 
believed that “MDLs would come in many shapes and sizes, and [that] judges 
would need exibility in order to manage them.”109 They feared that strict 
rules could interfere with the need to “adapt to changing circumstances, new 
laws, and dierent kinds of litigation.”110 In order to preserve judicial 
exibility and independence, the drafters of the MDL statute attempted to 
avoid rulemaking and kept the locus of control with the Panel.111 Civil Rules 
for MDL proceedings would put this design at risk, potentially threatening 
the basic features of MDL.112 
Litigation has only become more complex in the fty years since § 1407 
was passed. The increase in MDL proceedings, and in their complexity, is a 
reason to retain exibility rather than “freeze procedure” through a set of 
specic new rules.113 MDL increases litigation eciency in many ways: it 
allows related multidistrict claims to be handled, even if not tried, in a single 
district; reduces duplicative discovery; and permits resource pooling. These 
benets cut both ways: plaintis benet from pooling resources, placing them 
on a more level playing eld with well-resourced defendants, while 
defendants benet from centralized discovery and the prospect of global 
peace if all claims can be settled jointly. 
It is not apparent that adding MDL-specic rules will promote judicial 
eciency. The Panel has expressed “skepticism about whether rule changes 
would materially improve MDL practice”—that is, whether rule changes 
would make MDL more ecient.114 It reported that “[p]anel members are 
open to work on shared concerns, but may be inclined to think that distinctive 
 
107 J. Maxwell Heckendorn & Steven E. Swaney, Meritless Claims Create Inefficiencies in Multidistrict 
Litigation, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/meritless-claims-
create-ineciencies-multidistrict-litigation [https://perma.cc/8MJR-VK8Y]. 
108 S. REP. NO. 90-454, at 2 (1967). 
109 Bradt, supra note 98, at 103. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 90-91. 
112 Id. at 91. 
113 Id. at 104. 
114 APRIL 2018 MEETING, supra note 19, at 158. 
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aspects of dierent MDLs make some overarching set of new rules hard to 
imagine.”115 Many judges insist that MDL “is unique, too dierent from case 
to case to be managed by the transsubstantive values that form the very soul 
of the FRCP.”116 In a series of interviews conducted by Abbe Gluck, every 
judge asked about the proposals to create MDL-specic rules opposed the 
idea.117 The judges insisted that each MDL is dierent, and “that the very 
hallmark of the MDL is the ability to deviate from traditional procedures—
i.e., for the judge to remain exible and creative in every case.”118 The judges 
also emphasized that MDL procedure is constantly changing and still a work 
in progress—and one that may never be complete. As a result, best practices 
are continually evolving, and what works well now may not work well ve or 
ten years from now. One judge noted that he “see[s] ways to change course 
each time, new ways to tweak [MDL procedure]. . . . If we [crafted rules] too 
early people would just go around them. . . . Every case is dierent.”119 
The plaintiffs’ bar has expressed similar concerns. It questions whether a 
one-size-fits all approach makes sense for MDL, which is intrinsically case-
specific.120 It also argues that “[j]udges need to remain empowered to exercise 
broad discretion in any particular case rather than be constrained by formalistic 
preconceptions of what a vocal minority consider to be ‘best practices.’”121 
 
115 Id. 
116 Gluck, supra note 30, at 1674. 
117 Id. at 1675. Gluck conducted lengthy and condential oral interviews of twenty judges—
fteen federal and ve state—each with signicant experience in MDL litigation. Id. She 
interviewed each judge in person or over the phone for approximately one hour. Id. 
Gluck asked the judges 
why they think MDLs are on the rise; how MDLs compare to class actions; how MDL 
procedure is made; about the relationship between MDL procedure and FRCP 16; 
whether a separate rule for MDLs would be a positive development or whether Rule 
23 could be expanded to include MDLs or make them less necessary; about 
relationships among judges and attorneys in MDLs; about federalism and choice of 
law; about relationships and coordination among federal judges and between federal 
and state judges; about concerns regarding access to justice, transparency, the 
individual case, and lack of judicial review; how MDLs dier from non-MDL cases; 
about the role of consent; why they think MDLs are increasing; how they learned how 
to conduct an MDL; about the MDL panel and its process; about requiring state-
court attorneys in parallel actions to pay into the common benet fund; and about the 
low remand rate. 
Id. 
118 Id. at 1689. 
119 Id. 
120 APRIL 2018 MEETING, supra note 19, at 205. 
121 Id. 
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B. Fairness 
One of the driving forces behind proposals to amend the Civil Rules is 
perceived unfairness to defendants created by uncertainties in MDL 
procedure.122 Lawyers for Civil Justice argues that current MDL processes 
lack transparency, uniformity, and predictability, resulting in an unbalanced 
litigation environment.123 The organization has expressed concern that “[i]n 
practice . . . the sheer number of cases led in MDLs means that defendants 
often cannot exercise their discovery rights until the litigation is well 
underway, at which point defendants (and courts) must expend signicant 
resources to identify and combat these claims.”124 
Scholars worry that MDL also results in unfairness to plaintiffs. Many of 
their concerns echo the defense side: that MDL lacks transparency, and that the 
absence of strict rules stunts the development of uniform procedural law.125 In 
addition, they worry about the loss of the individual claim, and that MDL is just 
“another mechanism that undermines trial and the traditional class action.”126 
It is true that in the MDL context plaintis often exercise less control 
over their cases than they would if the cases were being litigated 
independently. For one, there is the risk of settlement pressure: “An MDL 
judge will often lock transferred cases into the MDL forum in order to 
pressure settlements. When this happens and the MDL aggregation is very 
large, the personal control exerted by any individual plainti is weak.”127 This 
threat is made all the more troubling by the potential for MDL settlements 
to benet the attorneys more than the injured claimants.128 Without the 
 
122 See, e.g., LAWS. FOR CIV. JUST., MDL PRACTICES AND THE NEED FOR FRCP AMENDMENTS: 
PROPOSALS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE MDL/TPLF SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2018), https://www.lfcj.com/uploads/1/1/2/0/112061707/lcj_memo_-
_mdl__tplf_proposals_for_discussion_9-14-18__004_.pdf	[https://perma.cc/6WN8-9N53]	(“The 
asymmetric nature of MDLs encourages plaintis to le low- or no-merit cases against defendants, 
because the marginal costs of adding a new case are close to zero, while the costs of uncovering 
information about a claim’s lack of merit can be signicant.”). 
123 Id. at 1. 
124 Id. 
125 Gluck, supra note 30, at 1674. 
126 Id. 
127 Robert G. Bone, Making Eective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 
319, 339-40 (2008); see also id. at 339 n.76 (“The threat of long delays and high delay costs in the 
MDL forum often pressures plaintis to settle when they would prefer to have their cases 
transferred back to their home forums for trial.”). 
128 See D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 
2177 (2017) (“The risk that MDL settlements can include terms that benet the negotiating parties 
more than claimants is well recognized. . . . [C]laimants who are sucked into an MDL have little 
actual control over the litigation; lawyers on the PSC [plaintis’ steering committee] make the 
important decisions.”); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 67, 70 (2017) (“If leadership’s inuence is unchecked, it’s possible that lead attorneys 
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protections of class certication, “multidistrict proceedings lack the judicial, 
competitive-market, and institutional checks that can help safeguard and 
legitimize class outcomes.”129 And unlike in class actions, where Rule 23 
requires judges to ensure that settlements are “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate,”130 judges have little say in the settlement reached by MDL lawyers, 
who are often repeat players with the knowledge and experience to game the 
system for their own personal benet.131 
Others view MDL as, on the whole, benetting plaintis.132 Although a 
lack of MDL rules may result in fewer procedural protections than available 
in the class action,133 it can also increase access to the courts. Some judges 
have reported that without MDL, “the courthouses would be closed to the 
majority of cases that currently are consolidated.”134 One judge explained that 
“the only way we can ensure people can get lawyers is to most eciently 
manage the cases. When I look at the MDL, I see more people getting some 
redress than it would be if it had to be litigated fully.”135 Another stated that 
MDL is “not about closing the courthouse doors at all . . . . [The cases] never 
would have been able to be litigated on their own, especially for mass torts.”136 
In addition to concerns about fairness and predictability, there is also 
some concern that adopting special procedures for MDLs will create a new 
brand of forum shopping. MDL-specic rules favorable to plaintis (or their 
attorneys) might encourage plaintis to le their cases in separate districts, 
hoping that the Panel will centralize them into an MDL and apply the 
favorable rules.137 Alternatively, MDL-specic rules favorable to defendants 
might encourage them to seek consolidation in order to obtain those benets, 
instead of to further the goals of MDL: convenience, justice, and eciency. 
 
could secure generous common-benet fees for themselves, while generating suboptimal outcomes 
for some or all claimants.”). 
129 Burch, supra note 128, at 70-71. 
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
131 Burch, supra note 128, at 71. 
132 See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 30, at 1676 (describing how MDL opens the courthouse doors 
when they otherwise would be closed); Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, It’s Good to Have the 
‘Haves’ on Your Side: A Defense of Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation, 108 GEO. L.J 73, 101-03 
(“MDL allows plaintis to capture some of the advantages of repeat play without triggering the 
doctrinal tripwires of the class action.”). 
133 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certied class . . . may 
be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval. . . . [T]he court may 
approve [a settlement proposal] only after a hearing and only on nding that it is fair, reasonable, 
and adequate . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
134 Gluck, supra note 30, at 1676. 
135 Id. at 1696–97. 
136 Id. at 1697. 
137  Letter from Zachary D. Clopton, supra note 52, at 4. 
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C. Other Considerations 
Beyond eciency and fairness, there are additional considerations that 
must be weighed when considering MDL-specic rules. Many judges already 
take precautions to limit bias from “ad hoc” MDL procedure. Precautions 
include “put[ting] . . . MDL procedures on the record, creat[ing] case 
websites, transcrib[ing] all proceedings, and creat[ing] phone connections to 
allow lawyers, litigants, and even state court judges to listen to all 
proceedings.”138 As a result of these measures, several judges have observed 
that “MDLs [are] more visible to the stakeholders in any particular MDL 
than in non-MDL proceedings.”139 
Additionally, most of the proposals for amended rules focus on the “mega-
MDLs” that aggregate tens of thousands of cases, and the Subcommittee has 
elected to focus on this subset of proceedings.140 If the new MDL rules are to 
be transsubstantive, like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this narrow 
focus could create problems. As the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
noted, “[i]f one thinks about rules of general application, it may be dicult 
to characterize rules that only bear on the two dozen largest MDLs as tting 
readily in that category.”141 If the new rules are not to be transsubstantive, 
drafting rules that distinguish smaller MDLs from these “mega-MDLs” may 
exacerbate the costs of information gathering, as well as threaten the ecacy 
of any rules that are eventually adopted. That the overall number of MDL 
proceedings has been consistently declining in the last decade further 
suggests that MDL-specic rules may be of limited utility. 
David Noll argues that the push for MDL rules may be “misguided” 
because MDL is fundamentally dierent from ordinary civil litigation.142 
Rather, he views MDL as a form of public administration that should be 
subject to the same protections that have operated for decades to keep 
administrative agencies in check.143 He points out that, by delegating 
authority to the Panel and to the transferee judge in § 1407, Congress suggests 
that “the procedures appropriate to resolve, say, the opioid litigation cannot 
be dened ex ante. If Congress could anticipate the necessary procedures, it 
could enact them itself.”144 
 
138 Id. at 1689. 
139 Id. 
140 OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 102-03. 
141 APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 207. 
142 David L. Noll, MDL as Public Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV. 403, 455 (2019). 
143 See id. at 454 (“Because it evolved in parallel with modern administrative law, MDL lacks 
guarantees of transparency, participation, and ex post review applicable to administrative 
agencies.”). 
144 Id. at 455. 
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III. MDL RULE PROPOSALS 
At its October 2019 meeting, the MDL Subcommittee identified four topics 
as “the center of current work” on MDL rulemaking: (1) early vetting, (2) 
opportunities for interlocutory appellate review, (3) settlement review, and (4) 
third-party litigation funding disclosure.145 The Subcommittee has continued 
to explore these four subjects in its subsequent meetings, although it has 
narrowed its focus to the first three.146 This Part examines the appropriateness 
of these topics for rulemaking, not just for their individual merit but also to 
examine the appropriateness of the rulemaking enterprise as a whole. The 
purpose of this Part is not to provide a comprehensive history of all rule 
proposals the Subcommittee has considered and is likely to consider. Rather, 
this Part uses these four topics to offer more specific critiques of MDL-specific 
rules. The challenges presented by each of these topics reflect larger challenges 
in MDL rulemaking. Ultimately, this Part argues that an analysis of these four 
proposals shows that MDL-specific rules will not promote the two goals of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—efficiency and fairness—and accordingly the 
Rules Committee should decline to take these proposals further. 
A. Early Vetting 
The purpose of an early vetting rule for individual cases in an MDL is to 
weed out meritless claims. There is some agreement that unfounded 
individual cases present a problem in MDLs, but less agreement on whether 
the solution to that problem is new or amended MDL-specic rules.147 
In the absence of any rule, courts currently employ various methods to 
develop information about individual claims, including fact sheets, short-
form complaints, plainti proles, and censuses. Defendant fact sheets are 
also sometimes required. One possible rule revision is to make fact sheets 
mandatory for all MDLs, or for a certain subset of MDLs. The use of fact 
sheets is authorized by Rule 16(c)(2)(L), which permits courts to “adopt[] 
special procedures for managing potentially dicult or protracted actions 
that may involve complex issues, multiple parties . . . or unusual proof 
problems.”148 Fact sheets are questionnaires that elicit a wide range of 
information, including the circumstances of the plaintis’ exposures and the 
severity of their injuries. Judges use fact sheets to facilitate settlement 
 
145 OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 103-04. 
146 APRIL 2020  MEETING, supra note 21,  at 145, 148, 154; OCTOBER 2020  MEETING, supra 
note 22, at 151.  
147 See id. at 103 (indicating that there is little agreement about the prospect of nding a 
solution to meritless individual cases in a court rule). 
148 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L). 
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negotiations or to improve claim administration following settlement.149 
Recent research conducted by the Federal Judicial Center found that in 
proceedings covered by the study, plainti fact sheets were used in fty-seven 
percent of MDLs.150 In MDLs with over 1,000 actions, plainti fact sheets 
were ordered eighty-seven percent of the time.151 
In general, plainti fact sheets require: (1) health records,152 (2) personal 
identifying information,153 and (3) litigation history.154 Many include other 
information requirements, such as medical releases or disclosure of third-
party litigation funding, but none requires expert testimony or sworn 
statements.155 Plainti fact sheets can help winnow meritless cases by 
revealing claims that will be unsupportable because, for example, there is no 
documented injury or illness. Fifty-ve percent of proceedings involving 
plainti fact sheets involved motions to dismiss for failure to le substantially 
complete information.156 The frequency of dismissal proceedings following 
the use of plainti fact sheets suggests that, to an extent, the sheets are well 
suited for their purpose—eliminating meritless claims. This is because the 
plainti ’s failure to le a fact sheet, or to le a substantially complete fact 
sheet, may reveal a lack of injury, and, accordingly, an inability to provide the 
required information.157 A plainti who never used a defective product, for 
example, may not be willing or able to provide details about when the product 
was used.158 As a result, the use of fact sheets can “save defendants time, 
 
149 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.91 (2004). Plainti fact sheets are 
dierent than Lone Pine orders, which require production of case-specic, sworn expert evidence of 
causation. See, e.g., In re Digitek Prod. Liab. Litig., 264 F.R.D. 249, 255 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (“A Lone 
Pine order is designed to assist in the management of complex issues and potential burdens on 
defendants and the court in mass tort litigation, essentially requiring plaintis . . . to support their 
claims at the outset.”). 
150 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 81, at 1. 
151 Id. 
152 Health records include information about general health, health issues related to the 
product, names of doctors, pharmacies, and denial of health insurance. Id. at 2. 
153 Personal identifying information includes names, addresses, education, and employment. Id. 
154 Litigation history includes prior tort litigation, past bankruptcy, social security claims, and 
workers’ compensation claims. Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 4. This dismissal can be ordered pursuant to Rule 41(b) (providing for dismissal for 
failure “to prosecute or to comply with . . . a court order”) or Rule 37(b)(2)(A) (providing for 
dismissal for failure “to obey an order to provide or permit discovery”). See id.; FED R. CIV. P. 
41(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). 
157 But note that lack of injury is not the only reason a plainti may be unable to complete a 
fact sheet. In medical device injury cases, “long waiting periods and unclear request processes” can 
make it dicult for plaintis to gather the information they need from hospitals to fully complete 
a fact sheet. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nudges and Norms in Multidistrict Litigation: A Response to 
Engstrom, 129 YALE L.J.F. 64, 81 (2019). And the requisite information about, for example, a 
defective product, will sometimes be in the defendant’s exclusive control. 
158 OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 105. 
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money, and aggravation; conserve scarce judicial resources; expedite the 
resolution of claims; deter the ling of groundless suits; and safeguard the 
integrity of trial processes.”159 
But because plaintiff fact sheets are already used in eighty-seven percent 
of large personal injury MDLs, a new rule may be unnecessary.160 And because 
fact sheets may delay the resolution of smaller MDLs, a new transsubstantive 
rule could prove harmful rather than helpful if it applies across the board. 
Many MDL plaintiffs are facing serious, life-threatening injuries, and even a 
slight delay could jeopardize their chance at recovery.161 Further, MDL judges 
have the knowledge and expertise to quickly eliminate truly frivolous claims, 
making the benefit for imposing the delay all the more minimal. 
In addition, plainti fact sheets are not identical in every case in which 
they are used. Dierent courts and dierent judges require disclosure of 
dierent information based on the case-specic facts of the proceeding before 
them.162 While some judges may only want basic information about the 
plaintis’ injuries, others want detailed health records, including the names 
of all doctors, nurses, and pharmacies consulted by the plaintis.163 And for 
some MDLs, like the Navarette dog food litigation described in the 
Introduction, the “typical” human health-oriented fact sheet would be 
completely out of place. Because of this variety, it would be very dicult to 
craft a rule detailing the exact information that must be disclosed in all 
plainti fact sheets.164 Any possible rule would necessarily be vague, and a 
vague rule may be of little more use than no rule at all. Beyond just unhelpful, 
a vague rule may prove actively harmful: a judge may interpret the rule based 
on the particular MDL being decided, setting binding precedent for future 
cases that may be factually dissimilar. 
Requiring information disclosure through fact sheets also raises concerns 
about access to the courts. Forcing plaintis to produce evidence showing 
that their claims are not meritless may bar access to the courts when the 
necessary evidence is not in the plainti ’s possession, either because it is 
 
159 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2019) (discussing 
the benets of Lone Pine orders, many of which also apply to plainti fact sheets). 
160 OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 205 (“Even a modest rule change, such as 
including a ‘nudge’ to consider the utility of PFS/DFS treatment in an MDL in Rule 26(f) and Rule 
16, may be unnecessary.”). 
161 See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., MEETING 
MINUTES OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 22-23 (Apr. 2-3, 2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019-04_cv_minutes_final_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F9UX-YX42] [hereinafter APRIL 2019 MEETING MINUTES] (expressing 
concern that elderly plaintiffs may die while an appeal is pending). 
162 See APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 209 (“[T]hese orders tend to be specic to the 
circumstances of the litigation in which they are entered.”). 
163 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 81, at 2. 
164 APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 209. 
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dicult or costly to obtain or because it is in the control of the defendants. 
While requiring only medical records, personal identifying information, and 
past litigation history may not present access challenges, other proposed 
measures have pressed further. 
Consider, for example, the proposed Fairness in Class Action Litigation 
Act of 2017.165 Although the bill languished in the Senate, it provides a guide 
for what an early vetting rule might look like. The bill would have added a 
new subsection (i) to § 1407, providing that 
[i]n any coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings . . . counsel for a 
plainti asserting a claim seeking redress for personal injury whose civil 
action is assigned to or directly led in the proceeding shall make a 
submission sucient to demonstrate that there is evidentiary support (including 
but not limited to medical records) for the factual contentions in plainti ’s 
complaint regarding the alleged injury, the exposure to the risk that allegedly 
caused the injury, and the alleged cause of the injury.166 
Plaintiffs may well be able to present evidence supporting their injuries and 
exposure, but evidence about the alleged cause of injury is often within the 
defendant’s exclusive control. In products-liability litigation, for example, the 
defendant is usually in a better position to know about the manufacturing 
process that produced a defective product, or about clinical trial results for a 
defective drug. Placing the burden on plaintiffs to affirmatively produce 
evidence that may be outside of their control, often before any discovery has 
taken place, closes the courthouse doors to deserving, injured people, or at least 
makes it more challenging and time-consuming for them to bring their claims. 
But some rulemaking in this area may be appropriate because fact sheets, 
and to an even greater extent, Lone Pine orders, as currently employed are 
arguably inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.167 To bring 
these practices more in line with the Civil Rules, amendments may be 
necessary. While innovation is at the heart of MDL, MDL judges may not 
employ procedures that “stand in tension with—and permit courts to make 
end-runs around—certain procedural requirements.”168 Depending on what 
the fact sheets entail, they could violate Rule 8(a)(2) by requiring more than a 
short and plain statement,169 Rule 11(b)(3) by requiring pleadings to be verified 
without an opportunity for further investigation or discovery,170 or Rule 56 by 
 
165 H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017). 
166 Id. § 105 (emphasis added). 
167 For a discussion of how Lone Pine orders may be inconsistent with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, see Engstrom, supra note 159. 
168 Id. at 42. 
169 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
170 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
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dismissing claims without appropriate safeguards, like an opportunity for 
discovery and a finding that there are no genuine issues of fact.171 
Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”172 By requiring plaintis to 
submit fact sheets with information beyond a statement of the claim, such as 
evidence demonstrating exposure and causation, MDL judges in essence 
apply a heightened pleading standard—even above the plausibility standard 
created by Twombly and Iqbal—without any authority in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to do so.173 Further, using fact sheets to verify pleadings is 
contrary to Rule 11(b)(3), which requires only that counsel certify that the 
allegations “will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation . . . .”174 Rule 11 is structured this way 
because “sometimes a litigant may . . . need discovery . . . to gather and 
conrm the evidentiary basis for the allegation.”175 This is equally true in 
MDL. And as to Rule 56, a dissenting appellate court judge in California 
called a dismissal for failure to comply with a Lone Pine order “a bastardized 
process which had the purpose and eect of summary judgment but avoided 
the very procedures and protections the Legislature deemed essential.”176 The 
Eleventh Circuit has also cautioned that Lone Pine orders “should not be used 
as (or become) the platforms for pseudo-summary judgment motions.”177 
B. Interlocutory Appellate Review 
At the outset, it should be noted that the MDL Subcommittee has 
recommended against a new rule providing for expanded interlocutory appellate 
review.178 It is possible, however, that the full Advisory Committee will decide to 
consider further rulemaking efforts.179 The push for interlocutory appellate 
review in MDL precedes the Committee’s decision to consider MDL-specific 
rules.180 Proponents of increased appellate review worry that the MDL statute 
 
171 FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
172 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
173 See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (granting a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim when the plaintiffs’ allegations merely recited the elements of the cause of 
action, and requiring the facts alleged to be plausible); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (same). 
174 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
175 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
176 Cottle v. Super. Ct., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 897 (Ct. App. 1992) (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
177 Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). 
178 OCTOBER 2020 MEETING, supra note 22, at 154. 
179 See id. at 158 (“In case the full Advisory Committee concludes that further eorts are 
justied regarding interlocutory review	.	.	.	.”). 
180 See, e.g., Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643 (2011) (presenting an argument in favor of non-
discretionary interlocutory appellate review in MDL nearly a decade ago). 
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does not provide for meaningful supervision of district courts.181 They argue that 
early appellate review would curb the “excess power” of the presiding MDL 
judge and “create a foundation for global settlement based not on the coercion of 
a single trial judge’s potentially erroneous view of the law, but instead on carefully 
considered legal principles that have been forged in the course of full-scale 
appellate review.”182 
An early appeal does provide some eciency gains if a court can detect 
mistakes early on, as legal error in pretrial rulings generates eects that 
extend “far beyond the mere conduct of litigation.”183 These savings are 
amplied by the fact that MDLs often contain thousands of claims; a court’s 
resolution of a potentially dispositive question on appeal would save the 
judicial system the resources of resolving not just one case but many. 
Currently, interlocutory appeal of MDL decisions is available by 
permission of the district court using § 1292(b): 
When a district judge . . . shall be of the opinion that [an] order involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 
dierence of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state 
in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals . . . may thereupon, in its 
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order.184 
Put another way, under § 1292(b), a district court may “certify” an issue 
for appeal if it identies (1) a controlling question of law with (2) substantial 
ground for dierence of opinion and (3) an appeal may materially advance 
the termination of the litigation.185 
Empirical evidence suggests that § 1292(b) is not employed often, and 
even when it is employed, appellate review is rarely granted.186 Proponents 
of MDL-specic interlocutory appellate review argue that these data show 
that in large personal injury MDL proceedings, § 1292(b) does not, in 
practice, aord a meaningful opportunity to secure appellate review.187 They 
suggest that the “types of appeals envisioned by the proposed rule arise 
relatively infrequently in mass tort MDL proceedings, such that the adoption 
of [a rule authorizing immediate interlocutory appeal from orders that would 
 
181 Id. at 1646. 
182 Id. at 1648. 
183 Id. at 1667 (citation omitted). 
184 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
185 Id. 
186 Beisner, supra note 83, at 2. 
187 Id. 
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be dispositive of a substantial number of claims] would not add substantial 
new burdens to our federal courts of appeals.”188 
Interlocutory appellate review presents a particularly interesting subject 
for MDL rulemaking because there is already a close analogue in the class 
action context: Rule 23(f). Rule 23(f) authorizes a court of appeals to “permit 
an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certication,” but it 
does not create an appeal as of right.189 The court of appeals is “given 
unfettered discretion whether to permit the appeal, akin to the discretion 
exercised by the Supreme Court in acting on a petition for certiorari.”190 
Unlike § 1292(b), Rule 23(f) does not require that district courts “certify” an 
issue for appeal, nor does it limit appeals to “controlling question[s] of law” 
with “substantial ground for dierence of opinion.”191 
The case for a new interlocutory appellate review rule in the MDL 
context is harder to make out than in the class action context. There is no 
clear MDL analogue to the class certication decision, which is the dening 
moment in class action procedure.192 Proponents of a new MDL rule have 
suggested allowing immediate appellate review of “preemption rulings, 
rulings on the admissibility of expert opinion evidence, and rulings on 
personal jurisdiction.”193 Rule 23(f) deals with an order that routinely is 
among the most important in a class action. It is not apparent that preemption 
rulings, rulings on the admissibility of expert opinion evidence, rulings on 
personal jurisdiction, or any one order carries similar weight in an MDL.194 
As the Subcommittee points out, “the range of orders that might have such 
signicance in MDL proceedings makes it dicult to predict with condence 
which might have central importance in a given MDL.”195 
In addition to the difficulty of determining which decisions in an MDL 
ought to be covered, an immediate appeal rule may also significantly prolong 
litigation, undercutting the efficiency gains motivating the use of MDL in the 
 
188 Id. at 13. 
189 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
190 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment. The Committee further 
clarified “courts of appeals will develop standards for granting review that reflect the changing areas 
of uncertainty in class litigation.” Id. The Committee also added that “[p]ermission to appeal may be 
granted or denied on the basis of any consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive.” Id. 
191 Charles R. Flores, Appealing Class Action Certication Decisions Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(f), 4 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 27, 40 (2007). 
192 See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“A district court’s 
ruling on the certication issue is often the most signicant decision rendered in these class-action 
proceedings.”). 
193 APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 213. 
194 Id. at 212. 
195 Id. at 213-14. 
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first place.196 One judge at the April 2019 Subcommittee meeting reported 
that it can take two years to get an answer from a § 1292 appeal in his district.197 
As of 2018, the median time for federal circuit courts to resolve an appeal was 
eight and a half months.198 For plaintiffs with serious illnesses and injuries, 
this may be too long.199 Immediate review may also delay or defeat settlement 
efforts, or upset the balance between well-resourced defendants and plaintiffs 
who may be willing to settle for less than they deserve to avoid the hassle and 
delay of appeal. It will naturally increase the workload of the appellate courts 
and will create satellite procedural litigation concerning the appeals process.200 
Finally, an immediate appeal rule may “disproportionately benefit the mass-
tort defendants, who tend to have greater financial resources and will use that 
wherewithal to manipulate the litigation process and ‘wear out’ a plaintiff with 
inferior economic backing.”201 Because of these costs, the scales of efficiency 
and fairness tilt against an MDL-specific interlocutory appeal rule. 
C. Settlement Review 
Although it has not yet decided whether to recommend a new rule 
governing settlement review and, relatedly, the appointment of leadership 
counsel, the Subcommittee provided a sketch for such a rule at its October 
2020 meeting.202 Most relevant here, the rule sketch requires that any 
settlement terms agreed to by lead counsel “(1) must be fair, reasonable, and 
adequate; (2) must treat all similarly situated plaintis equally; and (3) may 
require acceptance by a stated fraction of all plaintis, but may not require 
acceptance by a stated fraction of all plaintis represented by a single 
lawyer.”203 It is helpful to keep this language in mind when considering the 
appropriateness of an MDL settlement rule. 
One of the benets of centralizing litigation through MDL is that 
collecting claims can promote settlement.204 Settlement often benets both 
parties, as well as the judicial system. It helps plaintis who have been harmed 
 
196 See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (“Permitting 
piecemeal, prejudgment appeals, we have recognized, undermines ‘ecient judicial administration’ 
and encroaches upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a ‘special role’ in managing 
ongoing litigation.”). 
197 APRIL 2019 MEETING MINUTES, supra note 161, at 21. 
198 Noll, supra note 142, at 463. 
199 APRIL 2019 MEETING MINUTES, supra note 161, at 22 (pointing out that, in medical device 
cases, “[m]any plaintis are elderly” and “[s]ome will die while the appeal is pending.”). 
200 Pollis, supra note 180, at 1690. 
201 Id. at 1691-92 (footnote omitted). 
202 OCTOBER 2020 MEETING, supra note 22, at 171-73. 
203 Id. at 173 (footnote omitted).   
204 Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical 
Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 906 (2001). 
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recover compensation for their injuries, and it helps defendants achieve global 
peace.205 Settlement may also produce more equitable outcomes in large 
products-liability cases not eligible for class certication, in which there is a 
risk that trying cases individually will deplete the recovery available to future 
injured plaintis.206 And for the judiciary, “[t]he exercise of broad settlement 
authority is arguably a matter of self-preservation for the federal court 
system: if meritorious claims do not settle, the system lacks the capacity to 
try all of the federally led claims individually.”207 
But settlement in the MDL context is also controversial. Critics of MDL 
settlements have argued that the law does not authorize this use of MDLs, 
and that this use does not t within the purposes § 1407.208 Others argue that 
the use of settlement in MDLs is “purposefully employed to avoid the 
safeguards that federal courts . . . erected to protect the rights of 
claimants.”209 The MDL Subcommittee is especially concerned that 
“plaintis represented by lawyers who do not participate in the centralized 
steering committee structure are not aorded a genuine opportunity for 
meaningful individual settlement negotiations.”210 This fear is particularly 
salient with inventory settlements. In an inventory settlement, the defendant 
agrees to pay the lawyers representing many plaintis and many cases a lump 
sum to settle all of the lawyers’ cases.211 This is problematic for many reasons. 
For one, it can create a “race-to-the-bottom” in which the defendant agrees to 
settle with the rst lawyer to accept their proposal (potentially reducing or 
eliminating the recovery available for other injured plaintis). In addition, 
plaintis who are more seriously injured may be disadvantageously lumped 
 
205 See Christopher B. Mueller, Taking a Second Look at MDL Product Liability Settlements: 
Somebody Needs to Do It, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 540 (2017) (“[D]efendants are willing to pay a 
premium—actually more to settle ‘the whole batch’ of cases brought against them than they would 
pay for all the individual claims if they settled one by one—for a ‘global’ MDL settlement (one that 
covers essentially all potential claimants).”); see also Samuel Issacharo & D. Theodore Rave, The 
BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 413-14 (2014) 
(describing defendants’ willingness to pay a signicant amount to resolve mass litigation). 
206 See generally Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (discussing the recovery 
risks of asbestos litigation that is not eligible for class-action certication). 
207 Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63 
EMORY L.J. 1339, 1377 (2014). 
208 Mueller, supra note 205, at 531; see also Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed 
Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 2245, 2289 (2008) (“[T]here is at least some reason for institutional uneasiness about more 
aggressive use of MDL procedures to maximize the judicial system’s ability to achieve the most 
comprehensive settlements.”). 
209 Mueller, supra note 205, at 531. 
210 OCTOBER 2019 MEETING, supra note 20, at 104. 
211 APRIL 2019 MEETING, supra note 54, at 217. 
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together with plaintis suering minimal injuries, reducing their bargaining 
power during settlement negotiations.212 
Like interlocutory appellate review, settlement review for MDL has a 
class action counterpart: Rule 23(e). Rule 23(e) was signicantly amended in 
December 2018. Relevant here, the amended Rule 23 requires courts to 
consider four factors when deciding whether a settlement is adequate: 
(i) [T]he costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the eectiveness of 
any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method 
of processing class-member claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of 
attorney’s fees, including timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required 
to be identied under Rule 23(e)(3).213 
MDL is not subject to the formal constraints of Rule 23(e). It does not 
require class certication, or a hearing, or equitable treatment of plaintis 
relative to each other.214 Rule 23 “sets limits, establishes criteria, and 
authorizes a degree of judicial supervision and control that is very much out 
of the ordinary,” while MDL centralization “operates free of those limits, 
ignores those criteria, and employs the same extraordinary judicial power.”215 
Some scholars and judges have likened settlement in the MDL context to 
a “quasi-class action,” implying that the same protections at play in Rule 23(e) 
should apply.216 There may be good reason, however, for treating settlement 
differently under the class action device than under the MDL device. Unlike 
class actions, MDL involves individual lawsuits with separate claimants.217 As 
a result, several courts—both federal and state—often have power over the 
plaintiffs, and “there may be no single court that is well positioned to facilitate 
and administer [a] global settlement.”218 This presents a problem for adopting 
a rule similar to Rule 23(e): which court will assess the fairness and adequacy 
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of the settlement, if no single court has power over all the settling parties?219 
To overcome this hurdle, some settlement agreements have included 
provisions appointing the MDL transferee judge to preside over the 
settlement, requiring the settling parties to consent to that judge’s authority.220 
But this strategy does not work if a party refuses to consent, nor is it clear that 
the drafters of the MDL statute intended to grant such a power. Settlement is 
much different than the pretrial procedures contemplated in § 1407. 
D. Third-Party Litigation Funding 
Third-party litigation funding is becoming increasingly common, and it 
involves increasingly large amounts of money.221 It entails investments in 
litigation by nonparties, often hedge funds, in exchange for a percentage of 
any settlement or judgment entered.222 The typical funding arrangement has 
been described as one in which 
a specialist funding company or a hedge fund . . . pay[s] the lawyers’ fees on 
an interim basis. . . . If you win, you pay a contingency fee out of the damages, 
usually expressed as a percentage of the damages up to an agreed cap. A typical 
contingency fee would be between twenty and fifty percent of the damages, 
with a cap of three to four times the legal costs advanced by the funder.223 
There are two types of third-party litigation funding: consumer funding 
and commercial funding.224 Consumer funding usually involves individual 
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plaintis, as in personal injury or divorce actions.225 It may cover things like 
living expenses for plaintis waiting for resolution of their cases and usually 
does not involve much money.226 Commercial funding is more often used for 
business-to-business disputes, class actions, and mass tort litigation.227 This 
form of litigation funding often involves signicant sums of money—
potentially millions of dollars.228 
Currently there are no federal rules requiring disclosure of third-party 
litigation funding in any context. But proposals have been made to amend the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include disclosure of third-party funding 
as part of the Rule 26 required disclosures, even outside of the MDL 
context.229 Third-party litigation funding can be relevant to the court for many 
reasons: there may be financial conflicts of interest between the judge and the 
funder, or a judge may need to resolve allegations of financing abuses.230 
While the funded party is usually the plaintiff, both plaintiffs and defendants 
can benefit from third-party litigation funding.231 Plaintiffs can litigate cases that 
they otherwise could not afford to bring, and they can receive financial support 
for housing and other obligations while their cases are ongoing.232 Likewise, 
defendants can shift the costs of litigation to a third-party more able to bear them 
and can hedge risks that they are unwilling or unable to take.233 
While third-party litigation funding can help plaintis aord to bring 
their cases and allow defendants to hedge some of the risks of litigation, it 
also has its costs. Some courts and commentators worry that such funding 
will lead to increased settlement failures and interference in the attorney-
client relationship.234 Concerns about third-party litigation funding are not 
new. Champerty, dened as an “agreement to divide litigation proceeds 
between the owner of the litigated claim and a party unrelated to the lawsuit 
who supports or helps enforce the claim,” has been restricted since the 
nineteenth century.235 Opponents of third-party nancing argue that, like 
champerty, it encourages excessive, unnecessary, or speculative litigation, 
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spurred by the desire of third parties to make a prot rather than the desire 
of injured plaintis for redress.236 
As of 2019, twenty-four districts and six circuits have local rules “that 
seem to point toward disclosure of third-party funding.”237 But third-party 
litigation funding is not limited to MDL proceedings—in fact, it does not 
appear to play a distinctive or noteworthy role in MDL proceedings as 
compared to other forms of litigation.238 Because third-party litigation 
funding is not MDL-specic, an MDL-specic rule will not address all of 
the concerns expressed by proponents of disclosure. Additionally, because the 
use of third-party litigation funding is growing rapidly, and because most 
transferee judges have not reported being aware of its use in the MDL 
litigation before them, it seems that the most appropriate vehicle for further 
study of a disclosure rule is not the MDL.239 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO RULEMAKING 
When deciding whether to promulgate new federal rules, it is important to 
also consider the alternatives to federal rulemaking. In the MDL context, 
advocates of change have several alternatives: Congress could pass a new 
statute;240 the Rules Committee could amend the existing rules;241 the Rules 
Committee could appoint a Working Group; the Panel could issue additional 
guidance to litigants and their attorneys;242 or the Manual for Complex Litigation 
and similar resources could provide more education on MDL proceedings.243 Like 
new rules, these mechanisms for procedural change come with their own costs, but 
they may nevertheless be better suited for the MDL context. 
A. Action by Congress 
In 2017, the House introduced the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act, 
backed exclusively by Republicans, which would have signicantly reformed 
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MDL procedure.244 Although the bill passed the House on party lines, it did 
not make it through the Senate. Many of the bill’s provisions are similar or 
identical to proposals submitted to the MDL Subcommittee.245 If passed, the 
bill would have included “(1) a requirement of evidentiary verication of 
allegations within forty-ve days of ling or transfer,” akin to an early vetting 
rule; “(2) a bar on bellwether trials without consent; (3) enhanced 
interlocutory review of most orders issued by the MDL judge; and (4) a 
requirement that personal-injury plaintis receive ‘not less than 80 percent 
of any monetary recovery.’”246 The House Judiciary Committee explained the 
purposes of these provisions: “[MDL] proceedings, often largely consisting 
of claims that should never have been led, impose unfair burdens on courts 
and defendants and prevent plaintis with trial-worthy claims from timely 
getting their day in court.”247 
But procedural change through Congress has its limits. It takes time, and 
often reects party ideologies.248 As the history of § 1407 suggests, getting 
statutes passed in Congress often requires signicant strategic planning and 
maneuvering.249 Additionally, Congress may lack the MDL-specic expertise 
needed to draft rules that account for the nuances of MDL proceedings; the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has worked closely with the Rules 
Committee in considering new rules, but it may be unable or unwilling to 
assist Congress in the same capacity. Because of these limitations, 
congressional action may not be an eective mechanism for MDL reform. 
B. Working Groups 
Another alternative to new MDL rules is to set up an MDL Working 
Group. A Working Group could review the problems identied by 
proponents of new MDL rules and determine whether further action is 
necessary. A Working Group has some advantages over the current work 
being done by the Subcommittee: it could be given a nite period of time to 
conduct research, ensuring that the concerns of both proponents and 
opponents of new rules are timely addressed, and provide a formal report 
addressing the Group’s ndings. 
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Such a strategy was employed in 1999 with the creation of the ad hoc 
Judicial Conference Working Group on Mass Torts.250 The Mass Torts Working 
Group met four times “to identify and catalog” the most significant and 
pressing problems created by the increase in mass tort litigation and “to 
consider the full range of potential solutions,” including “legislation, rules, case 
management, revised practices, or education.”251 The Group determined that 
the best solution involved “a combination of legislation, rules, and case 
management.”252 A similar strategy might work well for MDL, as there is 
significant overlap between many large MDL proceedings and mass torts. At 
the very least, the creation of an MDL Working Group would provide an outlet 
for scholars and litigants to voice their concerns about ad hoc MDL procedure. 
C. Amending Current Rules 
Instead of creating new MDL-specic rules, the Rules Committee could 
amend the current rules to include special provisions for MDLs. This was 
done in 2006, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to 
account for changes in litigation brought about by new technology.253 The 
amendments “were intended to clarify the discovery rights and obligations of 
the parties in cases with electronic discovery and, in so doing, provide 
guidance to litigants, lawyers, and judges.”254 
But amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure presents many of the 
same challenges as promulgating new rules. The e-discovery rule amendments 
were the product of over five years of work, and MDL amendments would 
likely require a similar—if not greater—time commitment.255 Additionally, rule 
amendments do not resolve the efficiency problems presented by new rules: if 
the purpose of the MDL statute is to allow judges to flexibly resolve complex 
litigation, even rule amendments threaten to stifle the ability of MDL judges 
to craft creative solutions to novel problems. 
 
250 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND THE WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (1999), 
https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/
mass_tort_litigation_report_1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7TX-JKHG]. 
251 Id. at 1-3. 
252 Id. at 6-7. 
253 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26(a), 26(b), 26(f) 33, 34, 37(f) (laying out guidelines for the 
use of technology in trial preparation). 
254 Emery G. Lee III, Effectiveness of the 2006 Rules Amendments, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 191, 194 (2010). 
255 Thomas Y. Allman, The Impact of the Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 2-4 (2006). 
310 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 275 
D. Education 
The Rules Committee could also recommend increasing the amount of 
educational resources available about MDL proceedings and best practices, 
aimed at both transferee judges and MDL lawyers. It could push for 
modications to the Manual for Complex Litigation, as it suggested at its 
April 2020 meeting,256 or recommend that the Panel oer more guidance on 
managing MDLs. The Manual for Complex Litigation already contains 
extensive directives about settlement review in the MDL context—including 
information on coordination in multiparty litigation, organizational 
structures, powers and responsibilities, and compensation.257 The Manual 
could add similar provisions on the use of fact sheets and census techniques, 
perhaps using research by the Federal Judicial Center as a guide.258 Because 
the Panel has been working closely with the Rules Committee since it rst 
began considering MDL rule proposals, it is likely that the Panel would be 
receptive to any recommendations that the Subcommittee nds will improve 
MDL procedure. The Panel already has an “active approach to educating 
MDL judges” and an updated website, and it seems probable that the Panel 
would be amendable to providing additional guidance if requested.259 Using 
these channels, the Panel could raise awareness, for example, about the use of 
plainti fact sheets to encourage more MDL judges to employ them to screen 
for meritless claims. It could also provide sample fact sheets and other 
resources to further support MDL judges through the litigation process.260 
Alternatively, the Subcommittee could recommend that standards be 
established to promote transparency and uniformity in MDL proceedings.261 
There is already “broad agreement on the general standards that should 
govern large-scale aggregations,” set out, for example, in the American Law 
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.262 The 
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Subcommittee could seek to formally codify these standards, or at the very 
least to publish them on the Panel’s website and to update the standards as 
MDL continues to evolve. 
Focusing on education rather than new rules preserves the exibility that 
transferee judges need to handle novel procedural challenges. It also allows 
judges to treat dierent MDLs dierently and give heightened scrutiny to 
mega-MDLs when necessary. In terms of fairness, education reform can draw 
attention to meritless claims in mega-MDLs and oer specic guidance for 
dealing with them. The Panel or Manual could identify criteria for MDL 
judges to consider when deciding whether to certify an issue for appeal under 
§ 1292(b) or criteria for approving settlements, addressing concerns about the 
need for appellate and settlement review. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have two purposes: to make 
litigation more ecient, and to make litigation fairer. The corporate defense 
bar seeks to create new federal rules specically for MDL proceedings, but 
not to advance either of these purposes. 
A Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is currently 
deciding whether to undertake a more serious examination of creating new 
MDL-specic rules, and it should decline to take the enterprise any further. 
While some proposals have more merit than others, MDL-specic rules 
cannot be squared with either the purposes of § 1407 or the twin aims of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—eciency and fairness. The judges and 
scholar behind the creation of § 1407 wanted to grant federal judges exibility 
to develop creative solutions to novel procedural problems. They carefully 
crafted § 1407 to preserve this exibility. In the fty years since § 1407 was 
passed, litigation has only become more complex, and the need to preserve 
this exibility is more acute than ever. 
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